Held by the heart and loved by the chain
Apr. 23rd, 2006 11:59 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
cincinnatus_c
High today, here: 8. Dewpoint then: 8. High dewpoint: 8.
High today in TO: 6. Dewpoint then: 6. High dewpoint: 6.
Low today on the balcony: 7.3. High: 8.8. Currently: 8.4.
Some more interesting Ignatieff to go with the boring: a few days ago, some chain of links led me to this article by Ignatieff, in which, I guess you could say, he tries to clarify his position on torture, which is this: torture, though not coercive interrogation short of torture, must be prohibited absolutely by law, though under some "ticking bomb" circumstances interrogators will inevitably resort to torture; those circumstances should mitigate sentence, not exonerate. And the reason why torture must be absolutely prohibited: because it is contrary to the identities of liberal democratic societies. Which is, on the face of it, an extraordinarily weak argument; for it to be at all convincing, you'd have to say why allowing torture under some circumstances would shatter liberal democratic values (and I have no idea whether that case can fully be made; I doubt it can). It's similar to an argument that Ronald Dworkin has made against MacKinnon on pornography and the idea of freedom: MacKinnon's argument that porn interferes with the freedoms of women is irrelevant in the American context because it involves a positive conception of freedom which is excluded from the American understanding of freedom; the American understanding of freedom is simply negative, and while positive conceptions may not be indefensible, they are not American, and the American understanding is defensible; moreover, it is a good thing that there is a place such as the US in which freedom is understood simply negatively, even if it might also be a good thing that there are places in which freedom is not so understood.
If this is essentially all Ignatieff has to say on torture, then he does sidestep the problem whether the interrogator in the ticking bomb situation is morally justified in torturing. It looks like he thinks the interrogator is morally justified--it looks like he might even think it's morally obligatory to torture if you believe it's the only way to prevent a catastrophe--but if that's the case, then his legal position seems to be perverse: the law makes a mockery of itself if it condemns people for doing things which are morally justified, let alone obligatory. (Once upon a time, at the height of my Rand period, I answered the Heinz dilemma by saying that Heinz should steal the drug, but he should also be punished for it, and his punishment would make it that much more noble. That sort of adolescent romantic idealism seems as if it might be lurking in Ignatieff's position on torture, and I suspect it's just that kind of attitude in Ignatieff that Adelman takes issue with in his book on Ignatieff, which is available tucked away on the internet, and which I wish I had time to read. (Well, you know, I could be reading it right now.... (Which reminds me that today, for the first time, I went back to see what I'd said about a moral luck article I couldn't fully recall having read last summer, which reassures me that this thing can, actually, not be a complete waste of time.)))
I'd add that it's worrisome to talk about these "ticking bomb" scenarios without addressing McCain's contention that torture is always worse than useless. On the one hand, you'd think, McCain would know, and what does Ignatieff know? ... but on the other hand, you wonder if McCain is overgeneralizing from his own experience. One thing's for sure: Ignatieff's argument that torture must have some utility or else so many interrogators wouldn't think it's useful is just ridiculous, and it's disconcerting that Ignatieff would make it.
I neglected, back there in the craziness, to eulogize Pat Quinn. I always liked Pat Quinn; it's just not going to be the same without him. He reminds me of LaRussa, which is a good thing and a bad thing: he's a thinking coach--but also, incongruously, a hothead, under certain circumstances (how many other managers have gotten into more than one pre-game altercation with the opposing manager, and how many other head coaches have picked up a penalty for abuse of officials at the Olympics?)--who understands the game maybe too much for his own good. Like LaRussa, he's got an extraordinary regular-season record and has won far fewer championships than it seems he should have (i.e., in Quinn's case, none). What, I think, in the end, got Quinn fired is the same sort of thing that might keep LaRussa from going all the way: he had become an observer. He saw too well what was going on.
High today in TO: 6. Dewpoint then: 6. High dewpoint: 6.
Low today on the balcony: 7.3. High: 8.8. Currently: 8.4.
Some more interesting Ignatieff to go with the boring: a few days ago, some chain of links led me to this article by Ignatieff, in which, I guess you could say, he tries to clarify his position on torture, which is this: torture, though not coercive interrogation short of torture, must be prohibited absolutely by law, though under some "ticking bomb" circumstances interrogators will inevitably resort to torture; those circumstances should mitigate sentence, not exonerate. And the reason why torture must be absolutely prohibited: because it is contrary to the identities of liberal democratic societies. Which is, on the face of it, an extraordinarily weak argument; for it to be at all convincing, you'd have to say why allowing torture under some circumstances would shatter liberal democratic values (and I have no idea whether that case can fully be made; I doubt it can). It's similar to an argument that Ronald Dworkin has made against MacKinnon on pornography and the idea of freedom: MacKinnon's argument that porn interferes with the freedoms of women is irrelevant in the American context because it involves a positive conception of freedom which is excluded from the American understanding of freedom; the American understanding of freedom is simply negative, and while positive conceptions may not be indefensible, they are not American, and the American understanding is defensible; moreover, it is a good thing that there is a place such as the US in which freedom is understood simply negatively, even if it might also be a good thing that there are places in which freedom is not so understood.
If this is essentially all Ignatieff has to say on torture, then he does sidestep the problem whether the interrogator in the ticking bomb situation is morally justified in torturing. It looks like he thinks the interrogator is morally justified--it looks like he might even think it's morally obligatory to torture if you believe it's the only way to prevent a catastrophe--but if that's the case, then his legal position seems to be perverse: the law makes a mockery of itself if it condemns people for doing things which are morally justified, let alone obligatory. (Once upon a time, at the height of my Rand period, I answered the Heinz dilemma by saying that Heinz should steal the drug, but he should also be punished for it, and his punishment would make it that much more noble. That sort of adolescent romantic idealism seems as if it might be lurking in Ignatieff's position on torture, and I suspect it's just that kind of attitude in Ignatieff that Adelman takes issue with in his book on Ignatieff, which is available tucked away on the internet, and which I wish I had time to read. (Well, you know, I could be reading it right now.... (Which reminds me that today, for the first time, I went back to see what I'd said about a moral luck article I couldn't fully recall having read last summer, which reassures me that this thing can, actually, not be a complete waste of time.)))
I'd add that it's worrisome to talk about these "ticking bomb" scenarios without addressing McCain's contention that torture is always worse than useless. On the one hand, you'd think, McCain would know, and what does Ignatieff know? ... but on the other hand, you wonder if McCain is overgeneralizing from his own experience. One thing's for sure: Ignatieff's argument that torture must have some utility or else so many interrogators wouldn't think it's useful is just ridiculous, and it's disconcerting that Ignatieff would make it.
I neglected, back there in the craziness, to eulogize Pat Quinn. I always liked Pat Quinn; it's just not going to be the same without him. He reminds me of LaRussa, which is a good thing and a bad thing: he's a thinking coach--but also, incongruously, a hothead, under certain circumstances (how many other managers have gotten into more than one pre-game altercation with the opposing manager, and how many other head coaches have picked up a penalty for abuse of officials at the Olympics?)--who understands the game maybe too much for his own good. Like LaRussa, he's got an extraordinary regular-season record and has won far fewer championships than it seems he should have (i.e., in Quinn's case, none). What, I think, in the end, got Quinn fired is the same sort of thing that might keep LaRussa from going all the way: he had become an observer. He saw too well what was going on.
