Just gimme some truth
Jul. 6th, 2006 11:59 pmHigh today, here: 23. Dewpoint then: 11. High dewpoint: 12.
High today in TO: 24. Dewpoint then: 10. High dewpoint: 13.
Low today on the balcony: 13.1. High: 22.8. Currently: 17.6.
I really need to stop coming back here. There's always a rejection letter waiting for me.
This stuff's getting old. And the Meno paper, oh, the Meno paper, this time (after nearly eleven months!). But, well. At least it came with one of the reviews. The review identifies as the paper's thesis something that is, actually, a sub-thesis, and doesn't discuss the main argument of the paper at all, so that's, actually, useful, in a way, sort of. Now, the question is, do I just ship it out again, or do I undo the stitches, open it up, and add that Phaedo bit (and God knows what else, at this point).
Have now read chapter 3, devoted to explicating Foucault on truth, of Prado's book. It just about drove me up the wall, for a variety of reasons, but look, here's the thing: if Foucault believes that there is a determinate way the world is (or way things are, or whatever), and Foucault believes that truth does not consist in some relation of something like correspondence between how we say the world is and how the world actually is, then what does consist in a relation of something like correspondence between how we say the world is and how the world actually is? I mean, if "the cat is on the mat" isn't true because the cat is on the mat, then what is "the cat is on the mat" because the cat is on the mat? Because, I mean, the cat's being on the mat sure seems to do something to my saying "the cat is on the mat", and it's really hard to say what that something might be other than: IT MAKES IT TRUE!
Oh yeah: gave up trying to read Prado on the Greyhound, because it was too jiggly for underlining and exclaiming, so I started on Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia, which I bought several weeks ago mostly because Thomas Hurka keeps saying it's the best philosophy book ever written by a Canadian (which, of course, has to make you wonder: what's the second-best?), though also because it seems to be the very heart of the canon of philosophy of sports, such as it is. I have, so far, mostly just been amused by the parallels between the opening grasshopper death scene and the Socratic death dialogues, which actually suggested something to me that I wouldn't likely have otherwise thought of: when Rosencrantz or Guildenstern says to Hamlet or Laertes or whoever in the Euthydemus that teaching, uh, let's see ... oh, Benvolio, will change him into something he's not and therefore will kill Benvolio, Plato could actually be suggesting something about Socrates: Socrates might as well die rather than radically change, i.e., stop philosophizing, because it pretty much amounts to the same thing. I mean, it's a silly argument when Guildencrantz makes it, but there's often something serious buried in Plato's jokes....
High today in TO: 24. Dewpoint then: 10. High dewpoint: 13.
Low today on the balcony: 13.1. High: 22.8. Currently: 17.6.
I really need to stop coming back here. There's always a rejection letter waiting for me.
This stuff's getting old. And the Meno paper, oh, the Meno paper, this time (after nearly eleven months!). But, well. At least it came with one of the reviews. The review identifies as the paper's thesis something that is, actually, a sub-thesis, and doesn't discuss the main argument of the paper at all, so that's, actually, useful, in a way, sort of. Now, the question is, do I just ship it out again, or do I undo the stitches, open it up, and add that Phaedo bit (and God knows what else, at this point).
Have now read chapter 3, devoted to explicating Foucault on truth, of Prado's book. It just about drove me up the wall, for a variety of reasons, but look, here's the thing: if Foucault believes that there is a determinate way the world is (or way things are, or whatever), and Foucault believes that truth does not consist in some relation of something like correspondence between how we say the world is and how the world actually is, then what does consist in a relation of something like correspondence between how we say the world is and how the world actually is? I mean, if "the cat is on the mat" isn't true because the cat is on the mat, then what is "the cat is on the mat" because the cat is on the mat? Because, I mean, the cat's being on the mat sure seems to do something to my saying "the cat is on the mat", and it's really hard to say what that something might be other than: IT MAKES IT TRUE!
Oh yeah: gave up trying to read Prado on the Greyhound, because it was too jiggly for underlining and exclaiming, so I started on Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia, which I bought several weeks ago mostly because Thomas Hurka keeps saying it's the best philosophy book ever written by a Canadian (which, of course, has to make you wonder: what's the second-best?), though also because it seems to be the very heart of the canon of philosophy of sports, such as it is. I have, so far, mostly just been amused by the parallels between the opening grasshopper death scene and the Socratic death dialogues, which actually suggested something to me that I wouldn't likely have otherwise thought of: when Rosencrantz or Guildenstern says to Hamlet or Laertes or whoever in the Euthydemus that teaching, uh, let's see ... oh, Benvolio, will change him into something he's not and therefore will kill Benvolio, Plato could actually be suggesting something about Socrates: Socrates might as well die rather than radically change, i.e., stop philosophizing, because it pretty much amounts to the same thing. I mean, it's a silly argument when Guildencrantz makes it, but there's often something serious buried in Plato's jokes....